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Abstract 
Initial margin is the part of the multilevel guarantee system, operated by central counterparties. The main 
goal of this guarantee system is to manage the risk caused by taking over counterparty risk from the 
participants during trading on stock exchanges. Based on this risk overtaking, the counterparty risk is being 
centralized, and concentrated at the central counterparties. The regulators have perceived this risk, and 
established the so called EMIR regulation in Europe in 2012. Our paper will focus on an initial margin 
calculation method of a European central counterparty, which is compliant with the requirements of the 
EMIR regulation. Our focus, will be a special type of financial asset, the certificates. We show how the initial 
margin calculation model should be changed, and developed in order to be able to capture the specialities of 
these asset. 
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1. Introduction 
The role of a central counterparty is to take over counterparty risk from market participants during trading 
on stock exchanges. Central counterparties are part of the financial market infrastructure (FMI). ‘FMIs that 
facilitate the clearing, settlement, and recording of monetary and other financial transactions can strengthen 
the markets they serve and play a critical role in fostering financial stability. However, if not properly 
managed, they can pose significant risks to the financial system and be a potential source of contagion, 
particularly in periods of market stress.’ (CPSS-IOSCO, 2012). According to this the regulators realized that 
central counterparties has an important role regarding the stability of the whole financial system. To facilitate 
this stability the regulators have published the so called EMIR (European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
– 648/2012/EU) regulation in Europe in 2012, while the Dodd Frank Act (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act) in the USA in 2010. These regulations are based on the CPMI-IOSCO (CPMI: 
Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure3; IOSCO: – International Organization of Securities 
Commissions). Not only the systematically important payment systems’ (SIPS) role was the reason to 
regulate the CCP-s after the crisis, but also the fact, what was stated by the G20 in Pittsburgh in 2009 that by 
2012 the OTC transactions should be executed through CCP-s (FSB, 2010). It was visible that CCP-s could 
resist crisis ‘easily’. In the history there were only three CCP-s that went bankrupt, the Caisse de Liquidation 
(Paris) in 1974, the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House in 1983, and the Hong Kong Futures 
Guarantee Corporation in 1987 (European Commission, 2016, Hills et al. 1999).   
                                                          
1 Marcell Béli: Email address: beli.marcell@gmail.com phone: +36203469172    
2 Kata Váradi: affiliation: Corvinus University of Budapest, email address: kata.varadi@uni-corvinus.hu, address: 
Fővám square 8, Budapest, 1093., phone: +36302342500 
The research have been carried out at KELER CCP, while this paper has been:  Supported by the ÚNKP-17-4-
III-BCE-10 (1500000696) new National Excellence Program of the Ministry of Human Capacities. 
3 Is the same as CPSS (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems).  
2 
 
Since this paper will focus on a certain initial margin model, which has created by the KELER CCP Ltd., the 
CCP of Hungary, so in this paper the requirements of the European regulation will be introduced regarding 
the initial margin calculation. The central counterparty (CCP) of Hungary, the KELER CCP Ltd. has 
developed a new margin calculation method in 2017, which was published by Béli and Váradi (2017). This 
paper is built on that model, and shows how the model should be modified in order to be able to apply it for 
certificates.  
The initial margin is one part of the multilevel guarantee system, that a CCP should operate, based on the 
EMIR regulation. For example in the case of the KELER CCP, this system is the following (KELER CCP 
2016):  
- Basic financial collateral 
- Initial margin 
- Variation margin 
- Supplementary collateral  
- Additional financial collateral 
- Collective guarantee fund 
The focus of our paper is only the initial margin, so we will show only that in details. The role of the initial 
margin is to provide collateral for the change of the financial asset’s price in normal market conditions. The 
initial margin model should meet the requirements of several market participants: the regulator, the traders, 
and the CCP itself. The most important regulatory requirement regarding the initial margin is to use a risk 
measure (like value at risk, or expected shortfall) with 2 days liquidation period, and on a 99% significance 
level, with a 250 days lookback period. Also the initial margin should contain a 25% procyclicality buffer to 
decrease the effect of procyclicality in the financial system (EMIR, 2012, RTS, 2013).4 However, CCPs must 
bear in mind not only the compliance with the regulatory requirements, but also the fact that they should 
meet the requirements of market participants. This is because market participants expect the margin to be as 
stable over time as possible, while effectively reflecting market developments, and should also be easily 
reproduced, which means that CCPs should employ few expert decisions, i.e. the margin should be 
determined automatically and objectively. Another crucial factor is that CCP-s use a methodology that can 
be applied uniformly to all products. While a CCP-s goal could be on one hand to have a stable and relatively 
high margin in order to manage risk efficiently. Although on the other hand a CCP would like to decrease 
the initial margin as much as possible in order to attract the market participants. The CCP-s are competing 
with one another for clients.  
In the paper of Béli and Váradi (2017) they introduced an initial margin calculation method that fulfills these 
requirements, in case of stocks and currencies. However in case of other type of products, like bonds, or 
certificates, the margin cannot be calculated with the ’basic’ model, since the risk factors, on which the VaR 
model is based are not the same.5 So their model should always be modified, when one want to determine 
margin on a product which has different risk factors, than stocks.  
The study is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents the initial margin calculation method of Béli and Váradi 
(2017), Chapter 3 shows how the initial margin model should be changed in case of certificates, while in 
chapter 4 and 5 the results of the backtest and sensitivity analysis can be found. Finally chapter 6 concludes.   
 
                                                          
4 In case of stock exchange transactions.  
5 In case of illiquid and IPO products the initial margin calculation was shown by Béli et al. (2017). 
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2. Margin calculation method 
The initial margin calculation methodology of Béli and Váradi (2017) has the following requirements in 
focus: 1) Meet the requirements of the EMIR regulation; 2) Follow market trends; 3) Stable margin; 4) 
Automated and objective procyclicality buffer management; 5) Few expert decisions. 
In this paper we introduce shortly the initial margin model, since it is described in details in Béli and Váradi 
(2017): 
1) VaR determination: The risk measure the model is using the Value at Risk, since it has the advantage 
compared to the Expected Shortfall, that it is easier to backtest (Acerbi and Székely, 2014; Yamai and 
Yoshiba, 2005), it is elicitable6 (Ziegel, 2016; Gneiting, 2011), and fewer data are enough for reliably 
calibrating the model and it is not sensitive to outliers. The model applies the delta normal method for 
VaR calculation, which requires to assume that the assets logreturn is normally distributed. Based on 
this, the two parameters that are needed to calculate the VaR is the standard deviation, and the mean 
value of the daily logreturns (Jorion, 2007). In the case of the standard deviation, not only the equally 
weighted standard deviation, but the standard deviation with exponentially weighted moving average 
(EWMA) weighting is determined also. Standard deviation with EWMA weighting gives the currently 
prevailing market trends a higher weight than older trends (J.P. Morgan and Reuters, 1996). Margin 
computation will be based on the standard deviation with the lower value on the day concerned. This 
way we can avoid the immediate excessive increase of the margin value in the case of panic; however, 
in the case of decrease, the margin does follow the market. The formulae used are as follows: 
 
Value at risk determined based on return: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛⁡(𝜎𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 ∙ 𝑁−1(99%);𝜎𝐸𝑊𝑀𝐴 ∙ 𝑁−1(99%))   (1) 
Where 𝜎𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙/𝜎𝐸𝑊𝑀𝐴 denotes the equally/EWMA weighted standard deviation of the logreturns, while 
N-1 stands for the inverse of the standard normal distribution’s cumulative distribution function. 
   
Value at risk determined for price in the case of logreturn: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = −𝑃𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝑒
√𝑇∙𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
      (2) 
Where Pt stand for the spot price of the financial asset, while T stand for the liquidation period.  
 
Value at risk increased by liquidity- and expert buffers: 
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∙ (1 + 𝜑) ∙ (1 + 𝜃)     (3) 
Where 𝜑 denotes the liquidity buffer, 𝜃 is the expert buffer. The aim of the liquidity buffer is to give an 
extra buffer for those assets that are traded with low market liquidity. The role of the expert buffer is to 
manage other appearing risks, and also to ensure that the backtest shows a 99% adequacy. Since the VaR 
is based on statistics and probabilities, the 99% in the backtest can be fulfilled only on expected value, 
so it means that sometimes it is lower, sometimes it is higher than 99%. If the model do not reach the 
99% for some reason, the expert buffer can be increased.  
 
                                                          
6 Elicitablity means whether the result derived from the degree of risk can be verified or confirmed with other 
estimations. 
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Value at risk increased by procyclicality buffer also: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∙ (1 + 𝜑) ∙ (1 + 𝜃) ∙ (1 + 𝜋)     (4) 
Where  𝜋 denotes the procyclicality buffer. The role of the procyclicality buffer is to be able to decrease 
the value of the margin (with the procyclicality buffer exhaustion) in case when there is stress on the 
market, to help the market participants (Berlinger et al., 2017).  
 
2) Procyclicality buffer management: Procyclicality buffer exhaustion is linked also to the relative values 
of the two standard deviations. If the EWMA weighted standard deviation is higher than the equally 
weighted standard deviation, the procyclicality buffer value can be exhausted, since it shows that in the 
last days the volatility on the market was high; conversely, the procyclicality buffer is built back. 
However, an additional criterion of build back is that the procyclicality buffer is not built back fully until 
the EWMA standard deviation drops, with a certain extent, below the equally weighted standard 
deviation. The following formula illustrates the buffer exhaustion and build back criterion: 
 
𝜎𝐸𝑊𝑀𝐴 ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡−1
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡
; 1) > 𝜎𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙     (5) 
 
However, in order to avoid jumps in the margin value due to buffer exhaustion and build back, we use 
the following formulae: 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑜−𝑒𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡−1; 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡)  (6) 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑜−𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑⁡𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑜−𝑒𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛; 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡)  (7) 
 
The margin minimum value formula is produced with the combination of equations 5-7: 
𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑖𝑓 (
(𝜎𝐸𝑊𝑀𝐴 ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡−1
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡
; 1) > 𝜎) ;⁡
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡−1; 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡); 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡); 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡
) (8) 
 
3) Margin band: In order to keep the margin as stable as possible, margin computation will not be based on 
the minimum margin value, as it would mean that changes in the VaR value would, in most of the cases, 
trigger changes in the margin value also. This would not serve the interests of the market. Therefore, a 
so-called margin band would be created. As long as the valid margin is within the margin band, margin 
would not be modified. The minimum margin value and maximum margin value equalling the minimum 
margin value plus a certain % determine the margin band. The narrower the band, the more frequent the 
margin modification. The formulae applied are as follows: 
 
Maximum margin value determination: 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝜏)    (9) 
Where 𝜏 stand for the margin band.  
 
 
 
5 
 
Margin value determination: 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑖𝑓(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡−1 > 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡;𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡)   (10) 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑖𝑓(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡−1 < 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡;𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡)   (11) 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑖𝑓(𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 > 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡−1 > 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡;𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡−1) (12) 
For each product, parameters are determined based on the backtest results. It is checked at the product level 
that in the backtest the expected value in the value at risk model meets the 99% level, and that the margin 
meets the 100% level. The objective is to set parameters that meet these requirements. Also sensitivity test 
should be made to see that to which parameter is the margin model is the most sensitive. Only one parameter 
cannot be defined by the backtest and the sensitivity analysis, namely a lookback period. The lookback period 
is important, because the EMIR regulation states, that the lookback period should be at least 12 months, but 
it should contain a stress period as well. In this paper we will not be dealing with the determination of the 
lookback period of certificates, since it is the same as in the case of the stock, which was introduced by Béli 
and Váradi (2017).  
Figures 1 illustrate the margin value under this methodology if the liquidity and expert buffers are 15%, while 
the margin band is 25% for the most liquid Hungarian stock, the OTP. In the figure showing changes of the 
margin value, ‘standard deviation’ and ‘EWMA standard deviation’ values can be seen on the secondary y 
axis. If one want to stabilize the margin, the only thing is need to be done, is to increase the margin band. 
While the level of the margin can be increased or decreased by the buffers (Béli and Váradi, 2017).  
 
Figure 1: OTP margin value 
Source: Béli and Váradi (2017) 
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In sum, the solutions to reach the goals are the following:  
1. Meet the requirements of the EMIR regulation of the risk measure: Value at Risk (VaR) model with 
a 2 day liquidation period, with a 250 days look back period, on a 99% significance level, with the use 
of the extra 25% procyclicality buffer. 
2. Following market trends: determination of the EWMA weighted standard deviation in addition to the 
equally weighted standard deviation in VaR calculation.  
3. Stable margin: use of margin band. 
4. Automated and objective procyclicality buffer management: procyclicality buffer exhaustion and 
build back based on the relative relationship of the two standard deviations with different weights. 
5. Few expert decisions: A) Creation of margin groups within which parameters are standard.7 B) 
Determination of liquidity and expert buffer values based on backtest results. C) Stress definition to 
determine appropriately the lookback period. 
Despite stating that the methodology applied to equities can also be used in the case of other products such 
as currencies and commodities, it is important to ellaborate on how the methodology can be applied to other 
product groups in line with the particularities of the product concerned. In the case of equities, currencies 
and commodities, the risk arising from one risk factor is to be managed, however, there are a number of other 
products where several risk factors influence the product price, such factors cannot be ignored in margin 
computation. One example for a kind of product like this, are the certificates, the focus of our paper.  
3. Margin calculation for certificates 
The margin methodology of certificates is different from the margin methodology of equities. In addition to 
the risk of price change of the underlying, FX risk is to be considered also in the case of certificates with 
non-HUF based underlying. However, we do not manage the risk arising from FX rates change separately 
but consider the correlation of the two risks by determining the Value at Risk based on the yield calculated 
from the HUF-based price of the underlying of the certificate, and not determine separately a Value at Risk 
to quantify price risk and another to quantify currency risk. If the correlation of the price of the underlying 
and the currency rate were perfect, we would not make any mistake by doing so. However, the lower the 
correlation of the price change of the underlying and the currency rate change, the lower the Value at Risk 
in HUF, compared to considering separate Value at Risk for the two risk factors and converting their sum to 
HUF. For this reason, in this initial margin calculation method the correlation of the two risk factors should 
be monitored daily, and if the expert finds that the computed Value at Risk underestimates risk, it can increase 
the value of the expert buffer to manage the resulting risks.  
There is another difference with certificates in the determination of 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡, as there is a multiplier by 
product that has to be used to multiply the VaR values increased with the buffers, in line with equation 13, 
regardless whether the underling of the certificate is HUF-based or non-HUF-based.8  
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝜑) ∙ (1 + 𝜃) ∙ 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟   (13) 
Figure 2 shows the ERSTE DAX margin under this margin methodology (liquidity buffer 10%, expert buffer 
10%, margin band 25%). Figure 3 contains the same information for Erste DAX Turbo Long certificate. 
There is a difference in the parameters of the two product, different multipliers are applied (Erste DAX value 
is 0.001, Erste DAX Turbo value is 0.01). 
                                                          
7 This was not discussed in this paper in details.  
8 The part of the formula that is new compared to the standard case is highlighted in red.  
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Figure 2: Erste DAX margin value 
 
Figure 3: Erste DAX Turbo Long margin value 
Changing the expert buffer is of importance in the case of certificates because of another risk factor also. In 
the case of turbo certificates with index underlying there is an additional risk factor also: the risk of currency 
interest rate change. This risk arises from the funding cost of the issuer that is built into the certificate price. 
In the case of long certificate, the interest rate is above the risk-free interest rate of the currency that increases 
the price of the certificate, in the case of short certificate the rate is below the risk-free interest rate and 
decreases the certificate price. However, this impact is so low and related to a small group of certificates, this 
is not integrated into the margin computing general methodology in the case of certificates, in order to prevent 
the methodology from becoming too complex, but separate expert decision can be made to increase the expert 
buffer. Thus, any increased risks arising due to the change of the risk-free interest rate can be managed by 
the new methodology. 
 
a) Short certificates 
In the case of short certificates, if the underlying is non-HUF-based, a multiplier is used to determine the 
margin due to the short position also. This is the ‘short/long correction’ multiplier, its value is a variable 
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parameter in the system. This correction is required as the influence of individual risk factors – change in 
underlying price and change in currency rate – on the value of the certificate need to be considered. The 
following table summarizes the influence of changes in fundamentals, risk factors on certificate prices: 
 
Table 1: Influence of changes in fundamentals on certificate value9 
One direction price changes caused by several fundamentals at the same time represent the greatest risk. If 
we accept the economic premise that in global terms Hungary is a country with small economic strength and 
thus it does not create but ‘suffers’ major economic cycles, then it follows that short certificates represent the 
greatest risk for us. To justify this statement, there are two lines of thinking to consider: 
1. Economic prosperity cycle: in this cycle the HUF strengthens, but at the same time indices, securities, 
commodities abroad also strengthen, with prices increasing. Both effects have negative impact on 
short certificate prices that decrease and result in a high price change. Contrary to this, the effect on 
long certificate prices is of the opposite direction, thus absolute price change is less. Red arrows in 
Table 1 show the effect of such changes.  
2. Economic crisis cycle: in this cycle the HUF weakens, but at the same time indices, securities, 
commodities abroad also weaken, with rates decreasing. Both effects have positive impact on short 
certificate prices that increase and result in a high price change. Contrary to this, the effect on long 
certificate prices is of the opposite direction, thus the absolute price change is less. Green arrows in 
Table 1 show the effect of such changes. 
In summary, short certificate margin will be based on the following formula: 
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝜑) ∙ (1 + 𝜃) ∙ 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 ∙ (1 +
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) (14) 
It is noted that the statement that short positions carry the highest risk is not valid for all products. Therefore, 
expert decision is needed to determine whether short/long correction is needed. For example: the yield index 
of German bonds is the underlying of the EURO BUND certificates. As yield and bond price move in 
opposite directions, in the case of this product, in line with the above logic, long certificates mean the highest 
risk, thus it is recommended to apply correction of reverse direction. Figure 4 shows the Erste DAX Turbo 
Short margin determination, if short/long correction parameter is 5%, all other parameters remain the same 
as with the long example (Figure 3). 
                                                          
9 Source: http://www.erstebroker.hu/static/befrt/download/Turbo_certifikat_es_warrant_UET_151231.pdf 
Downloaded: 23 March 2016  
Index 
certificate
Price Price Leverage Price Leverage
Increase
Decrease
Strengthen  -  -
Weaken  -  -
Increase  -  -  -
Decrease  -  -  -
Turbo long certificate Turbo short certificate
Price of underlying
Price of HUF in 
the FX of the 
underlying
FX interest of 
underlying
9 
 
 
Figure 4: Erste DAX Turbo Short margin value 
 
 
b) Certificate price determined in the currency of the underlying 
If settlement is not in HUF but in the currency of the underlying, Value at Risk is also to be determined in 
the currency of the underlying, as the holder of the contract runs the risk of price change only with respect to 
the underlying and is not exposed to FX rate risk. However, as CCP determines margin in HUF, the risk from 
conversion to HUF is to be taken into account. Consequently, for this product group the formula is modified 
as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖𝑛⁡𝐹𝑋 ∙ 𝑒𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡,𝐹𝑋
%
∙ 𝐹𝑋⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝜑) ∙ (1 + 𝜃) ∙ 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟   (15) 
As the short/long position issue that arises in the case of certificates settled in HUF does not apply to this 
product group, there is no need to use ‘short/long correction’. Furthermore, it is worth observing that 
although we would expect the margin need to be less in all cases when the underlying is considered in its 
own currency than if it has to be converted into HUF, as we are exposed to less risk, there is no FX risk. 
However, when Figures 3 and 5 are compared, it can be seen that products with the highest margin are not 
the same. This is due to the correlation of the risk of price change of the underlying and the FX risk, thus 
diversification effect can arise between the two risk factors, thus driving down the margin need. 
 
Figure 5: Erste DAX Turbo (EUR settlement) Long margin value 
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c) Reverse convertible and Bonus certificates 
The special feature of reverse convertible (RC) and Bonus certificates is that the maximum value of payment 
is limited. As soon as the price of the underlying reaches a set limit, payment is made based on the 
performance of the underlying. However, if the underlying price does not reach the limit set, then a ‘Bonus’ 
determined in advance is paid. Therefore, the formula used for other certificate types is to be supplemented 
with the bonus value, as the VaR value determined on yield distribution and the margin determined based 
thereon will not be appropriate, as in the case of yields calculated from the possible prices of certificates, we 
cannot assume normal distribution. For this reason, the determination of minimum margin is modified to 
check what the minimum margin would be if we decided to determine the margin as if there were no Bonus 
in the construction, and to check the Bonus value also (in the case of these products this is a certain percentage 
of the nominal value). Margin computation will be based on the higher of the two values. Thus, the following 
formulae will be modified: VaR calculation, and 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 determination (all other formulae remain 
unchanged).  
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡(𝑖𝑛⁡𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠,𝑅𝐶⁡)
= 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡ ∙
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙⁡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑃𝑡
   (16) 
𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑅𝐶/𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠
= 𝑀𝐴𝑋(𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡;𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ∙ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡)  (17) 
 
Figure 6: Erste-OTP reverse convertible margin value I. 
If we decreased the interest level, the second member, i.e. the ‘𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ∙ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡’ part would not 
always dominate in the formula to determine the minimum margin. For example: if all parameters remain 
unchanged and interest rate is decreased to 5%, margin would be as shown in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7: Erste-OTP reverse convertible margin value II. 
4. Backtest 
Back testing is performed in two ways for each product. On the one hand it is checked that how many times 
the actual daily price change exceeded the margin applied in the past 250 trading days, on the other it is 
checked how many times the actual daily price change exceeded the VaR value. In the case of VaR, the VaR 
computed with equally weighted standard deviation and the VaR with EWMA weighting are not checked 
separately, but always the lower value is used in the back testing, as this is the one used for margin 
determination also. Therefore, 99% compliance in the case of VaR will not be ensured, as we always use the 
lower value; however, it will be very near to 99% if the models work well and the parameters are appropriate. 
The objective is to achieve nearly 100% margin compliance as the buffers used should ensure that margin 
compliance is higher than 99%. The back testing results for all certificates are as follows: 
 
Table 2: Back testing result 
Table 2 shows that in the case of the products tested, margin compliance was always 100%, i.e. price change 
never exceeded the margin applied, and also the VaR based backtest was adequate, too. The following figure 
shows the backtest result for the Erste DAX Turbó Short. 
product group security margin
VaR (min: equally weighted, 
EWMA)
ErsteDAX 100.00% 100.00%
ErsteDAX Turbo Long 100.00% 100.00%
ErsteDAX Turbo Short 100.00% 100.00%
ErsteDAX Turbo Long EUR 100.00% 99.20%
ErsteDAX Turbo Short EUR 100.00% 99.20%
OTP Reverse Convertible 100.00% 99.20%
Average  100.00% 99.60%
Results
Certificate (based on 
200 days)
12 
 
 
Figure 8: Certificate: Erste DAX Turbo Short back testing 
 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
The sensitivity analysis is discussed in details in Béli and Váradi (2017). In case of the certificates the 
methodology is exactly the same, the only difference is, that there is an extra parameter tested, namely the 
‘short/long multiplier’.  Shortly, the purpose of sensitivity analysis is to check, ceteris paribus, how the 
change in one parameter changes the value of the margin to be used, and how it impacts the result of the 
backtest. Based on this we can check if the change of parameters is the same (e.g. 1%), which parameter will 
have most impact on the margin and the back testing result. The test was performed on the margin values 
used on 30 December 2015 (last trading day in 2015). The sensitivity analysis has been carried out to the 
short certificate. Starting parameters were as follows: significance level 99%, liquidation period: 2 days, 
liquidity buffer: 10%, expert buffer: 10%, procyclicality buffer: 25%, margin band: 25%, tolerance level: 
1%, short/long multiplier: 5%.  
Tables 3-4 show the margin and back test results that demonstrate what was already experienced by Béli and 
Váradi (2017) in the case of OTP, i.e. it is the change of the significance level that the model is most sensitive 
to. It can be seen that the significance level could not be modified in the positive direction with more than 
1% of the 99% value, as the value would exceed 100%. Furthermore, although in terms of mathematics the 
negative direction modification of 99% makes sense, this result does not represent material information for 
CCP (just like the liquidation period or the procyclicality buffer decrease), as the regulator restricts the 
minimum values of these parameters. It also can be seen from the results that the modification of the 
significance level had the most substantial impact, while even the modification of +/- 20% of the margin 
band and the tolerance level did not impact the margin value (same as Béli and Váradi, 2017).  
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Table 3: Certificates - margin sensitivity 
The back test also shows that there is no knockout even if the parameter change is of 20% (except for the 
significance level, the regulator does not allow it to decrease anyway). It can be concluded from the sensitivity 
Original margin EWMA multiplier
2620.00 a T liquidity expert procyclicality band g S/L
Change 99% 2 10% 10% 25% 25% 1% 5%
-20% -65.65% -11.07% -1.91% -1.91% -4.20% 0.00% -0.38% -1.15%
-19% -64.12% -10.31% -1.91% -1.91% -3.82% 0.00% -0.38% -1.15%
-18% -62.60% -9.92% -1.91% -1.91% -3.82% 0.00% -0.38% -1.15%
-17% -60.31% -9.16% -1.53% -1.53% -3.44% 0.00% -0.38% -0.76%
-16% -59.16% -8.78% -1.53% -1.53% -3.44% 0.00% -0.38% -0.76%
-15% -57.63% -8.02% -1.53% -1.53% -3.05% 0.00% -0.38% -0.76%
-14% -55.73% -7.63% -1.53% -1.53% -3.05% 0.00% -0.38% -0.76%
-13% -53.82% -6.87% -1.15% -1.15% -2.67% 0.00% -0.38% -0.76%
-12% -51.91% -6.49% -1.15% -1.15% -2.67% 0.00% -0.38% -0.76%
-11% -49.62% -5.73% -1.15% -1.15% -2.29% 0.00% -0.38% -0.76%
-10% -47.71% -5.34% -1.15% -1.15% -2.29% 0.00% -0.38% -0.76%
-9% -45.42% -4.96% -1.15% -1.15% -1.91% 0.00% -0.38% -0.38%
-8% -42.75% -4.20% -0.76% -0.76% -1.91% 0.00% -0.38% -0.38%
-7% -40.08% -3.82% -0.76% -0.76% -1.53% 0.00% -0.38% -0.38%
-6% -37.02% -3.44% -0.76% -0.76% -1.53% 0.00% 0.00% -0.38%
-5% -33.59% -2.67% -0.76% -0.76% -1.15% 0.00% 0.00% -0.38%
-4% -29.77% -2.29% -0.38% -0.38% -0.76% 0.00% 0.00% -0.38%
-3% -25.19% -1.53% -0.38% -0.38% -0.76% 0.00% 0.00% -0.38%
-2% -19.47% -1.15% -0.38% -0.38% -0.38% 0.00% 0.00% -0.38%
-1% -11.83% -0.76% -0.38% -0.38% -0.38% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1% 61.83% 0.38% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2% N/A 0.76% 0.00% 0.00% 0.38% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3% N/A 1.53% 0.00% 0.00% 0.38% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
4% N/A 1.91% 0.38% 0.38% 0.76% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
5% N/A 2.29% 0.38% 0.38% 0.76% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
6% N/A 3.05% 0.38% 0.38% 1.15% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
7% N/A 3.44% 0.38% 0.38% 1.15% 0.00% 0.00% 0.38%
8% N/A 3.82% 0.76% 0.76% 1.53% 0.00% 0.00% 0.38%
9% N/A 4.20% 0.76% 0.76% 1.53% 0.00% 0.00% 0.38%
10% N/A 4.96% 0.76% 0.76% 1.91% 0.00% 0.00% 0.38%
11% N/A 5.34% 0.76% 0.76% 1.91% 0.00% 0.00% 0.38%
12% N/A 5.73% 0.76% 0.76% 2.29% 0.00% 0.00% 0.38%
13% N/A 6.11% 1.15% 1.15% 2.29% 0.00% 0.00% 0.38%
14% N/A 6.87% 1.15% 1.15% 2.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.38%
15% N/A 7.25% 1.15% 1.15% 4.58% 0.00% 0.00% 0.38%
16% N/A 7.63% 1.15% 1.15% 4.58% 0.00% 0.00% 0.76%
17% N/A 8.02% 1.53% 1.53% 4.96% 0.00% 0.00% 0.76%
18% N/A 8.78% 1.53% 1.53% 4.96% 0.00% 0.00% 0.76%
19% N/A 9.16% 1.53% 1.53% 5.34% 0.00% 0.00% 0.76%
20% N/A 9.54% 1.53% 1.53% 5.34% 0.00% 0.00% 0.76%
VaR parameters buffers
Percentage change of the margin
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analyses of the backtests that currently parameter changes in the positive direction have no influence, as the 
back test originally showed 100% compliance at the margin level.  
 
Table 4: Certificates – back test sensitivity 
Original result EWMA multiplier
100.00% a T liquidity expert procyclicality band g S/L
Change 99% 2 10% 10% 25% 25% 1% 5%
-20% 86.40% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-19% 87.60% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-18% 88.40% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-17% 90.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-16% 91.60% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-15% 93.60% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-14% 94.80% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-13% 95.60% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-12% 96.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-11% 96.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-10% 96.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-9% 97.20% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-8% 98.80% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-7% 99.20% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-6% 99.60% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-5% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-4% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-3% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-2% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
-1% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
0% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
1% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
2% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
3% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
4% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
5% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
6% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
7% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
8% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
9% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
10% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
11% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
12% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
13% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
14% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
15% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
16% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
17% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
18% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
19% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
20% N/A 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
VaR parameters buffers
Back testing
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6. Summary 
The purpose of this study was to show how the initial margin calculation method can be used for certificates. 
The specialty of the certificates compared to stocks, commodities and currencies – to which the model has 
been introduced by KELER CCP in 2017 in the paper of Béli and Váradi (2017) – that there are more than 
one risk factor in the price evolution of the financial asset. The main results were, that we have shown how 
the time series of the price of the certificate’s underlying product should be taken into account in the model; 
how the multiplier – that is defined by the issuer of the certificate – has to be built into the calculation. Also 
our notable result was, that we have shown that in case of an emerging market, like Hungary, how the short 
turbo certificate position should be handled. Moreover we have shown how the margin should be defined in 
case of those certificates which has a pay off in another currency, than Hungarian Forint. Lastly, we have 
shown how the reverse convertible products’ margin should be defined. With a backtest and sensitivity 
analysis, we have confirmed, that the initial margin model we have built is adequate for the risk management 
purposes.  
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